Conversation with Senator Clifford Case - 3 March 1960

The Director said that he didn't want to add to the burdens of the Senator, but that he wanted to thank him for his statement 28 February. The Director said it was very helpful. The Senator indicated that it may have been chopped up in some papers; that it got wide publicity.

The Director said he was deeply appreciative.

The Senator said, "I don't usually bust out, but this time I got sore."

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From the Office of Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N. J.)

398-F

FOR RELEASE: A.M. Newspapers of Sunday, February 28, 1960

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE, MEMBER, SENATE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES

The suggestion has been made that the Central Intelligence Agency, and particularly Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of that Agency, withheld certain information from the Defense Department and, particularly, from General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There have also been suggestions that Mr. Dulles has been less than frank in his discussion of these matters in his testimony before the joint hearings of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences and the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, and, at least, has contributed to "confusion" about them.

There is no basis whatever for any suggestion that Mr. Dulles or the CIA ever withheld any information from the Defense Department or from General Twining. In fact, the Defense Department and each of the Armed Forces have their own representatives on the U. S. Intelligence Board. The U. S. Intelligence Board actually makes the estimates on which our government's top policy makers rely.

The matter in issue involves the U. S. Intelligence Board's estimate made in December, 1958, of Soviet long-range missile strength, then present and prospective, and the Board's current estimate of the Soviet Union's present and prospective long-range missile strength.

The Defense Department and General Twining, of course, had the 1958 estimate when it was made. They also have the current estimate.

The two estimates, the 1958 and the current one, were prepared on somewhat different bases. In order to permit Committee members to compare the two estimates, Mr. Dulles, earlier this year, presented a chart showing (a) the current estimate and (b) information based upon the 1958 estimate and presented in the form in which the current estimate is prepared.

What General Twining had not seen was the revised form in which the 1958 information was presented to the Committees. It represented no change in any intelligence estimates and no one could seriously believe that it did. It was prepared and presented simply for the use of our Committees to enable us to compare the 1958 and the current estimates. There is no basis whatever for the suggestion that the CIA was withholding any information from General Twining or from anyone else entitled to have it.

Further, the suggestion that Mr. Dulles either contributed to confusion on this subject or has been less than frank with our Committees has absolutely no foundation. His explanation of the matter to the Committees has been clear and consistent from the beginning. Confusion can exist only in the minds of those who want to be confused.

I am sorry it is necessary to speak out on this matter before

Committee hearings are concluded. In my opinion there has been far too much

premature discussion of the testimony in the hearings. I feel strongly that the

time to discuss this testimony is when our report is made and that such

discussion should not take place until the hearings have been completed and all

the testimony has been studied.

Until now I have followed this principle myself. But my high regard for the Central Intelligence Agency and for Mr. Dulles' effective and devoted service to our country in his present and other capacities requires me to speak out. This is a matter of simple justice to the Agency and to Mr. Dulles. It is even more important that the public should not be under unwarranted apprehension as to either the integrity or the competency of either the Agency or of its Director.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles This is to remind that you wish to call Senator Case about the attached 1 March 1960 (DATE) FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Mr. DApproved For lease 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP80B0167 002600120041-8

Attached is a memorandum from and a brief of your telephone conversation with Ken BeLieu this morning regarding Senator Johnson's invitation to speak in Texas on Sunday, 1 November.

In a further conversation with Ken BeLieu, learned that the main program will be held in Austin on Sunday from 9 to 3. Each speaker will talk about 30 minutes, followed by a 30-minute questionanswer period. This will be followed by a barbecue at Senator Johnson's ranch which is some 50-60 miles from Austin. According to BeLieu, Senator Johnson expects you and the other honored guests to spend Saturday night with him at the ranch and also Sunday night if you stay over.

You wish to call Secretary Douglas about transportation. (He may go to the Army-Air Force football game in New York Saturday afternoon and fly down to Texas Saturday night.)

You also wanted to check Senator Johnson's invitation with the White House.

Do you wish someone to draft some remarks for you or do you wish to do it yourself?

25X

25X

October 28, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Kenneth BeLieu returned the Director's call of earlier in the day, and apologized for not having reached him sooner. Mr. Dulles stated that he had gone over the matter of attending the Young Citizens meeting in Texas this week end, and had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Cornerstone Ceremony on Tuesday, and all the necessary last minute preparations for it, precluded his accepting the invitation, much as he would like to. He said the Ceremony sounds like a small thing, but it involves an awful lot, and that he felt he just couldn't be away these last few days. He also talked of the hazard of not getting back should the weather get bad. He mentioned also Bedell Smith's situation and that because of this he would not like to be away from Washington just at this time. He said he would love to do this and hoped the Senator (Johnson) would understand.

Mr. BeLieu assurred Mr. Dulles that the Senator would understand; that he had talked to his assistant last night and he said the Senator had said he hoped Mr. Dulles would be able to come down but that he would certainly understand if he couldn't. He said the Senator had tried to call Mr. Dulles last night.

Mr. BeLieu then said he thought a time would be found some time for the Director and the Senator to get together that would be a little more relaxing than this trip would be anyway, and the Director said he would like very much to have a chance to sit down and have a good talk with the Senator and that he would do almost anything for him, and greatly regretted that he could not make this particular trip.

The conversation then shifted to the North Pole trip and the DCI said this had been a wonderful trip, but that as he had just returned from it he was somewhat jammed up in his schedule and in his work. He said he hoped the Senator could make this trip some time and Mr. BeLieu stated that he very much wanted to and that he

hoped to arrange it at an appropriate time. The Director said that now would not be a good time -- that the early Spring or the Fall is the best time.

Mr. BeLieu then said again that he was sure the Senator would understand Mr. Dulles' inability to take the trip just now, and thanked him for his consideration of it. He said he would tell the Director all about it when he returned, and that he would see him at the Dedication Ceremony.

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